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Abstract: This paper aims to emphasize the influence that “Classic” Islamic Thought had on the
contemporary European-Islamic one regarding the conceptualization and action of emigration
(hijra-hajara) through the geographical and juridical redefinition of the Old Continent as a new “house”
(dar/bayt) in hosting a Muslim population. The analysis should also be considered in relation to the
sectarian and violent phase which followed the peaceful one of the so-called “Arab Spring” and the
current deflagration of part of the Middle East. During the proto-Islamic historical phase, the term
muhajirun was adopted to define those who made the hijra, referring to the prophet Muhammad’s
followers in 622. They aimed to live according to religious behaviour and started to be different
from their polytheist society of origin; the same term was also used to categorize those who partially
populated the new conquered territories in the following decades: Syria, Egypt, Mesopotamia, the
Iranian plateau, etc., and who decided to take root and become in-urbanized. The contemporary
juridical, political, and religious perception, before and after 2011, started to consider a different
“emigration” perspective, which, not so differently from the original hijra conceptualization, is rooted
in abandoning a land of warlike and sectarian violence to reach a geography where individual
religious affiliation can be safeguarded.
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1. Introduction. Qur’an and the Reasons for hijra
Due to the increase in war and sectarian violence in some Arab countries today, following the
failure of the “Arab Springs” as well as, for a longer period of time in states, such as Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Somalia, and lastly, their economic impoverishment since the beginning of the post-colonial
era, there has been huge emigration to Europe. The Islamic presence in this continent has reached the
relevant number of 25 million inhabitants out of a total population of half a billion.1
Since the 1990s, different authors with widely varying backgrounds: Yusuf al-Qaradawi,
Layla Babes, Tariq Ramadan, Bassam Tibi, Mohamed Arkoun, and the well-known Imams Tareq
Oubrou, Dalil Boubakeur, Hawaria Fattah, Sherin Khankan (Hashas et al. 2018), and institutions,
such as the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), have worked to produce an Islamic
jurisprudence for Muslim minorities outside the “official” geographical Dar al-Islam. According to it,
1 Pew Research Centre, 2017, these data do not consider Russia (www.pewforum.org/2017/11/29/europes-growing-muslim-
population/).
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“European Islam” has been turned into a reformist “start-up”, being able to reconcile being a Muslim
in a minority with being monotheist in a plurally religious continent.
The analysis of this article aims to consider two aspects, which are both related with violence
(‘anf ), in trying to determine on the one hand the ongoing connection between the early Islamic
elaboration of Hijra and the reasons why Muslims still emigrate today, while, on the other hand,
the redefinition of Europe, not only as a continent of refuge from discrimination and war, but as a place
that recognizes human-religious rights. The right to emigrate in searching refuge from fasad (a different
level of corruption), which is ongoing, affects the great majority of Islamic countries in the world2 as
well as escaping discrimination based on religious-political and inter-religious fighting (qital).
Can we historically and religiously compare the hijra of the early Muhajirin from Mecca, with
the Arab-Muslim emigrants today? Has contemporary Islamic thought been able to produce a clear
understanding and assumption of responsibility for the political and religious reasons behind these
new forms of hijra? Has the European Union done the same?
Why, after the deflagration of Syria, did those who escaped, try to reach Europe and not the Arab
Gulf? If, in fact, it is true that the great majority of Syrian refugees are still blocked in the emergency
camps in countries, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon, their requests to return home will probably
be unaffordable for the coming decades.3
All of these questions are indicative of an enormous problem of redefining the geographical
space of religious coexistence (Albrecht 2018) on the one hand, but also, on the other, the common
comprehension that the “populist Islamophobic” risk, although not yet in power in the heart of Europe,
is really close to becoming a huge alternative to every kind of proposal of integration.
However, the first step to be considered here is the production of an “original” meaning of Hijra
through a historical—Islamic studies methodology in a clear attempt to shape a more conformable and
dialogical background with European Muslims.
When considering the prophetic phase, it is important to pinpoint from the beginning the most
interesting aspects about the relationship between proto-Islam (being a believer, mu’min, in considering
F. Donner’s redefinition of Early Islam)4 and emigration (hijra/being a muhajir), starting from this focal
point: the submission to a monotheistic God was directly connected with so strongly believing in the
Prophet’s early message that they decided to emigrate from Mecca to Medina in 622: a paradigmatic
step that not only “partially”5 cut off the relationship of loyalty (wala’) and alliance (hilf ) with their
clan of origin, but pushed them to leave most of their belongings in Mecca.
In parallel, according to the Abrahamic roots of Islam, the Prophet’s hijra is the last one
considering the Islamic “Prophetic tradition” which identified figures, such as Abraham, but also
Moses, who emigrated twice during his life: the first alone, the second with the entire “nation of
Israel” leaving the land of idolatry and wandering in the Sinai desert for 40 years; David, who,
according to 1 Samuel (24:2–7) hid from Saul’s rage, and finally Jesus, who also emigrated twice,
once as a child when he was taken to Egypt away from the attempt by the King of Israel to kill him
(Crone 1994; Rubin 2003) and after his baptism at the age of 30 around the River Jordan area, wandering
for 40 days in the desert to be tempted by the devil. All of these are practically, but also symbolically,
Old and New Testament characterizations of muhajirin who paradigmatically undertook emigration
for religious/prophetic reasons.
2 Web source: https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018.
3 Web source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-43578469.
4 F. Donner (2011). Muhammad and the Believers. At the Origins of Islam, trans. Maometto e le Origini dell’Islam.
Torino: Einaudi.
5 I use the term partially here, because, as the post-Hijra historical phase will clarify, as the conquest of Mecca in 630,
reconciliation will not only be possible, but in many cases desirable (Guillame 1955).
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The Qur’an itself in the Medina part, if on the one hand provides little information on the Prophet’s
sole hijra (with Abu Bakr only); on the other hand, it deeply stresses his action and behaviour on the
path of God (fi sabili’llahi).
“Those who believed and emigrated [to Medina] and struggled (wajahadu) for God’s cause
with their possessions and persons, and those who gave refuge and help, are all allies (’awliya)
of one another. As for those who believed but did not emigrate, you are not responsible for
their protection (walayatihim) until they have done so. But if they seek help from you against
persecution (an-nasru), it is your duty to assist them, except against people with whom you
have a treaty (mithaq): God sees all that you do. The disbelievers support one another. If you
do not do the same, there will be persecution in the land and great corruption. Those who
believed and emigrated, and struggled for God’s cause, and those who gave refuge and
help—they are the true believers and they will have forgiveness and generous provision.
And those who came to believe afterwards, and emigrated and struggled alongside you,
they are part of you, but relatives still have prior claim over one another in God’s Scripture:
God has full knowledge of all things”. (Q 8: 72–75 (Abdel Haleem 2004))
However, also:
“Those who believe, who migrated and strove hard in God’s way with their possessions and
their persons, are in God’s eyes much higher in rank; it is they who will triumph” (Q 9: 20)
“In His mercy God has turned to the Prophet, and the emigrants and helpers who followed
him in the hour of adversity when some hearts almost wavered: He has turned to them;
He is most kind and merciful to them. (Q 9: 100, 117).
“The poor emigrants who were driven from their homes and possessions, who seek God’s
favour and approval, those who help God and His Messenge—these are the ones who
are true—[shall have a share] Those who were already firmly established in their homes
[in Medina], and firmly rooted in faith, show love for those who migrated to them for refuge
and harbour no desire in their hearts for what has been given to them. They give them
preference over themselves, even if they too are poor: those who are saved from their own
souls’ greed are truly successful. Those who came after them say, ‘Lord, forgive us our
sins and the sins of our brothers who believed before us, and leave no malice in our hearts
towards those who believe. Lord, You are truly compassionate and merciful”. (Q 5: 8–10)6
All of the above verses emphasized a similar attitude: the importance of emigrating when the level
of persecution reached its height, making it impossible for the believers to live in the community
where they were born. At the same time, those who have already accepted the Prophet’s message,
but for different reasons prefer not to emigrate, only have partial responsibility and are only partially
protected.
In fact, “[ . . . ] only in the case that they ask for help, is there a moral obligation to intervene, but
a treaty has been signed with the attackers, they should not be helped, but rather peace attempted
between them. Allah knows everything that is done regarding peace and other things”. (Abbas and
Al-Firuzabadi 2007).
During the prophetic phase, after the Hijra (622–32 A.D.), the geographical landscape was
identified by a new Ummah (a new religious and political community of believers), as shaped through
the union between Ansar (those who helped the poor emigrants) and the Muhajirun, to whom we can
6 All the Quranic verses translated into English in this article come from The Qur’an, tr. M.A.S. Abdel Haleem
(Abdel Haleem 2004).
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add those who have signed an agreement of peace with them: some Jews and some clans who were
still non-monotheists (Lecker 2001; Arjomand 2009).
The role of the Ansar as those with whom a pact was signed are also emblematic, not only in
stressing the capability of giving them refuge, but also for having given what was in their breasts
(sudurihim) to them before themselves. This is something more than being welcoming, because it
reflects on the maternal milk that is given to every newborn in the first months of life.
Therefore, the Qur’an clarified some important aspects of emigration, the concrete reasons for
performing it as the best possible reply that human beings should give on specific occasions, in particular
for those who are fleeing from persecution. In other words, the same as the early community of
believers in considering the “small” Hijra (614 A.D.) in reaching the protection of the Christian Emperor
of Aksum on the other side of the Red Sea (Guillame 1955, p. 143ff).
However, the direct connection between emigration and the following war (harb, qital) that will
bring the community of the Believers to conquer Mecca eight years later is a logical consequence of
the muhajirin’s incapability of taking their assets with them during the emigration; also in this case,
the Qur’an in the above verses clarifies how reciprocal help between the Ansar and emigrants was
necessary, like the ghazawat attitude to refund both of them their lost wealth (see the first battle of Badr
in 624 A.D.).
Overlooking this last reflection, the right to emigrate in the Qur’an is clearly considered in relation
to evident persecution, as it will be recognized in the Shari‘ah when the Christians Reconquistas imposed
conversion to the conquerors’ faith, which had a huge impact on the Islamic geographies, such as
al-Andalus and Sicily or during European Colonialism (Fierro 1991, pp. 11–41; Peters 1979).
2. The Early Islamic “Narrative” on Geography: The Creation of Borders and Ibn Taymiyya’s
Renewed View
The historical evolution of proto-Islamic conquests, which ended in the first half of the 8th century,
will not only implement the need for a frontier imposed as an armed one (Athamina 1987, pp. 5–25;
Donner 1996;7 Calasso and Lancioni 2017), but for a process to build up the Islamic identity in defining
the conquered territories in relation to the new political rulers. However, it is important to highlight
how, until the 9th–10th centuries, as for Palestine and Syria until the 11th–12th centuries, the majority
of the “conquered” population was not yet converted to Islam, debunking de facto the meanings of
Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb (Friedmann 2003; Donner 2011).
Accordingly, contrary to considering the Hijra as something that emerged later in Hadith, Sira,
and Maghazi literature, it is the Qur’an itself that stressed the importance of this paradigmatic praxis.
However, many questions still remained unanswered in this debate: starting from the canonization
process of the Islamic revelation that literature has increasingly placed in the same historical period as
when early “Islamic” writings emerged.
In parallel, Villano (2017, pp. 142–43), like Vercellin (2002, p. 22), considered that the
“Prophet Muhammad himself in performing the Hijra came out from a space to enter another
one” in a sort of fixed rigidity and antithetic of Fred Donner, R. Hoyland, Chase Robinson’s awareness
of the early “Islamic” century.
Villano and Vercellin wonder about a “narrative” of contrast that will emerge in Tabari’s age in
recognizing the Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Kufr a juxtaposition, with the Dar al-Harb not as synonymous, but
as consequent. It is clear that the Quranic moral-ethical dichotomy in making the Hijra is prominent,
even when only considering the “narrative” that Muhammad, after the conquest of Mecca, decided to
return to Medina, to be buried there in the “city of the Prophet”.
7 See Fred Donner, “The development of the concepts of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb”, Draft paper 3/13/96; I am grateful to
Fred Donner for providing a copy of this paper.
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Nevertheless, the community of early “believers” was probably so morally plural that to consider
the Hijra from the beginning with such a “strong” religious identification in a still Bedouin society is
a conceptual and historical hazard. It is clear, on the contrary, that the 9th century Islamic narrative
(Donner 1998), which would like to emphasize the Hijra praxis by identifying any “believer”, from the
beginning, as, already, a Muslim.
On the contrary, the end of the Arab conquering campaigns (first half of the 8th century), as well
as the construction of different militarized borders in Anatolia, the Khorasan region and northern
Spain, clarified a political-military need, strongly dissociated from the inter-religious, plural, and
still Islamic minority status which affected these geographies (Denaro 2017; Donner 1996, p. 2),
even though politically led by new Muslim authorities within a hierarchical Caliphate structure.
There is a clear dissociation from assuming a terminology as Dar al-Islam/Dar al-Harb at the end of
the 9th century beginning of the 10th and giving them a religious meaning: the siyar, jihad, maghazi
new hegemonic literature that came out at the beginning of the ‘Abbasid age in the works of Abu
Yusuf (d. 798): Kitab al-Radd ‘ala Siyar al-Awza‘i, Malik Ibn Anas (1981): Kitab al-Jihad in the Muwatta’,
Al-Shaybani (1966, d. 805): Kitab al-Siyar al-Saghir, and finally that of Fazari (1987), Kitab al-Siyar,
is (the literature) more generally prone to considering a geography of ard al-muslimin (the land of
the believers) that opposed the ard al-‘aduww (the land of the enemy) than to give an already clear
“religious” identification.
This emblematic interpretation is well supported by a plurality of historical factors as sources.
Starting from the former, the un-religious identification of the ghazawat is not only linguistically
linked with the neutral figure of the Ghazi, the warrior, as identified by the pre-Islamic anthropological
Arab praxis of raids (Chabbi 1997), but when the Arab conquering campaigns began to fail, attributed to
the absence of a propulsive force and to the first huge defeats by Carolingians and Byzantines (the second
siege of Constantinople in 717 A.D., but also the battle of Akronion in 740 A.D.), the stabilization
of a frontier became a political-strategic need on which many authors have already spent time
(Bonner 1996, 2006; Gleave and Kristo-Nagy 2015–2016) and on which a new “narrative” was shaped
in close connection with the creation of a first Islamic religious identity.
It is during the early ‘Abbasid age that the new Khalifas started to play a significant role in showing
their Islamic leadership as political-religious rulers: al-Ma’mun’s attempt to reconcile the Banu ‘Abbas,
the caliphate, with the Banu Hashim, the Imamate, like his leading role in the Mihna (the inquisition),
are symptomatic of this caliph’s intention to play a major political as well as religious role
(Gutas 1998; Cooperson 2005; Demichelis 2012). The assumption of what Bonner stressed in defining
Harun al-Rashid, al-Ma’mun, al-Mu’tasim as the first Ghazi-Caliphs in parallel with the destruction
of some churches as well as considering the Christians who lived on the border with Byzantium, an
inner fifth column, who worked for a Constantinople re-occupation of the Jazira area, was amplified
in Byzantine sources (Michael the Syrian, the Chronicle of 1234, the Chronicle of 813, Theophanis
Chronographia) more than on the Islamic side.
However, it is in this historical phase that juridical literature, as reported above, started to slowly
propose defining itself as Dar al-Islam instead of balad al-Muslimin, ard al-Islam, balad al-Islam, and in
defining the Dar al-Kufr instead of ard al-‘aduww, balad al-Harb etc. (Abu Yusuf 1938–1939, pp. 1–2, 19–21).
Nevertheless, this passage is limited in the Kitab al-Jihad of Ibn al-Mubarak as in Shaybani’s Siyar, or
Malik’s Muwatta’ for different reasons: the first was a pietist traditionalist who, despite being a member
of the court, was one of the first mujahid who decided to live a coherent Muslim life as well as stressing
his inner-soul in being a Muslim believer; the others were muhadditun, who shaped the first “Islamic”
warlike literature probably without ever even having seen the Thaghur (the militarized frontier).
However, if the land of the enemy (‘aduww) was not already religiously identified, its status is
clearly more open and the warlike attitude in fighting the enemy also needs to be more neutral: for that
reason, al-Shaybani’s Siyar, like the Kitab al-Jihad in the Muwatta, for example, discipline, for the first
time, an internal and foreign Caliphate policy regarding war: (1) in spreading Islamic hegemony in
the politically led Islamic land, (2) in making the Dhimmi respectful of the Islamic jurisprudence over
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them, a huge problem that will continue to be highlighted by al-Jahiz in his Radd ‘ala al-Nasara in the
9th century, and (3) in fighting the Muslim rebels, the brigands, as well as the apostates, in particular,
those who lived in the territories of the Caliphate: (Kelsay 2003) a clear juridical-state perspective.
Ibn al-Mubarak’s attitude (Ibn al-Mubarak 1972, no. 13, 15, 16), on the contrary, heavily maintains
“being-acting as a Muslim” in, as Donner said, a “paranaetic” inner praxis, which nevertheless
contains an innovative aspect in stressing that being a better Muslim includes Jihad as a basic duty
(Salem 2016, chp. 4; Melchert 2015, pp. 49–69). This is an aspect that is completely absent from other
Islamic literature on this topic.
The Kitab al-Jihad’s absence of the dualistic distinction between Dar al-Islam vs. Dar al-Harb, for
an author who fought on the border still remains problematic, in particular for the use of ard ar-Rum,
Byzantine territory, without adopting a religious identification. However, if Ibn al-Mubarak’s Kitab
al-Jihad is also to be related to his pietistic Kitab al-Zuhd, where there is no section on Jihad, it is therefore
important to highlight how at the beginning of the ‘Abbasid era, the identification of the enemy was
partially dissociated from a concrete religious identification in a Dar al-Islam, where Islam was certainly
still a minority. As reported by Tottoli (2017), we need to wait until the age of al-Tabari to consider the
concept of Dar al-Islam as corresponding to geographical territory in which Muslims were the majority
and where Islamic jurisprudence was also predominantly having an impact on the new religious
minority. However, when al-Tabari focused attention on Dar al-Kufr in his Tafsir, he identified the land
of war (Harb) against the Meccan’s unbelievers in his attempt to shape the assumption of the existence
of a more religiously founded Islamic identity from the beginning, from the early Prophetic age.8
It is then evident how the Hijra assumed from the beginning an “Islamic narrative”: a paradigmatic
role in emigrating from the Dar al-Kufr to a new geography where being and practising as a believer is
more promising.
In parallel, this 9th–10th century “narrative”, which was to be adopted in enforcing the Islamic
religious identity, is the same one that will perform a dualistic dichotomy, forgetting the inter-religious
plurality of the first believers, as indirectly admitted by M. Ibn Hanbal (Sizgorich 2009). The founder
of the Hanbalite school is the first to recognize the early proto-Islamic community as religiously plural,
the first to consider Ibn al-Mubarak’s jihad not univocally violent, but as a form of Hijra, and also the
first to consider “the best jihad a word of truth in the face of a tyrannical ruler” (Abu Dawud, n. 4344).
However, this juridical dichotomy, which was adopted for the reasons above described, would
have been subsequently attenuated for economic but also logical-rational justifications. The Qur’anic
origin of the Dar al-Ahd, or Dar al-Sulh (the land of truce) in 4: 90, clearly reflects on a scenario of war:
“But as for those who seek refuge with people with whom you have a treaty (mithaq), or who come
over to you because their hearts shrink from fighting against you or against their own people, God
could have given them power over you, and they would have fought you. So, if they withdraw and do
not fight you, and offer you peace, then God gives you no way against them”. It would also have been
adopted for other reasons: such as the economic ones in allowing for reciprocal trade, even during
historical phases of war such as the “Crusades”.
The most interesting aspect to consider is Ibn Taymiyya’s moral and logical reflection
(Ibn Taymiyya 1980, d. 1328) many centuries later, in classifying a territory as Islamic or “non-Islamic”
in relation to the level of faith, sin, and belief of the population and of its rulers, independently of
whether they were Muslims or not (Albrecht 2018, p. 70ff.). In his famous Majmu‘ Fatawa Shaykh
al-Islam Ahmad Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Taymiyya, in failing to consider the converted Muslim Mongol rulers
of Mardin as real Muslims, he asked the question of what makes a Muslim a real one and what
identifies a territory that is formally under Islamic rule the contrary. Here, it is prominent to consider
the composite status of the territory in relation to the individual-collective status of its inhabitants
8 In the following centuries, Islamic jurisprudence will also adopt the geographical definition of Dar Kufr ghayr Harb, the land
of unbelief without war in enriching the case studies on the subject.
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(Michot 2004), a paradigmatic passage that leads Ibn Taymiyya to consider the Ummah in a different
way. In the famous Mardin fatwa, the Hanbalite mujtahid, legitimized, as many before him, the residence
of Muslims under a non-Islamic jurisdiction on the condition that they could continue to practice their
religion. In another fatwa, in assuming that the Christian King of Abyssinia, after the minor Hijra
614 A.D.), secretly converted to Islam, without publicly clearly declaring it or implementing Islamic
policies, Ibn Taymiyya affirmed: “We know definitely that he could not implement the law of the
Qur’an in his community because his people would not have permitted him to. Despite that, the Negus
and all those who are similar to him found their way to the pleasure to God in eternity although they
could not abide by the laws of Islam and could only rule using that which could be implemented in
the given circumstances” (March 2009, p. 248). In this case, the Hanbalite author supports the idea that
it is also possible to please God, even without Islamic Law being the juridical base of the country.
In stressing the possibility of emigrating from the abode of War to the abode of Islam and faith,
this is obvious, in particular, if, in the land of unbelievers and hypocrites, allowing what God ordered
is not respected; however, in stressing the attention on Ibn Taymiyya’s thought:
“That a territory might be an abode of unbelief or of faith of sinners is not a necessary attribute,
but rather a contingent attribute depending on its inhabitants. Any territory in which the
inhabitants are believers and pious is at the moment the abode of the friends of God. And
any territory in which the inhabitants are unbelievers is at that moment the abode of unbelief.
And any territory in which the inhabitants are sinners is at the moment the abode of sin.
And so, it is with any others we have not mentioned that their inhabitation of a territory makes
it their abode”. (Majmu‘al-Fatawa, v. 18, pp. 281–82, quoted from March 2009, p. 307)
The Hanbalite’s conclusion clarifies that emigration from an Islamic/non-Islamic society is directly
connected with the status of belief and unbelief and to deal with the political, institutional, and
demographic-geographic factors.
The presence of sin and corruption is the objective situation that matters for Ibn Taymiyya, quite
independently of whether we are dealing with a Muslim or non-Muslim society.
In his un-historicized interpretation of the early meaning of Hijra, which, at the beginning of the
Islamic age, has more a political than a religious function, Ibn Taymiyya highlights, in the 14th century,
that emigration is a form of repudiating evilness, a devotional form of piety in avoiding sin, stressing
the departure from a land of corruption (fasad and fitna).
When considering the above excursus, actualizing this previous analysis in the contemporary
period is now relevant. According to eminent Islamic religious scholars who still use pre-Modern
Islamic literature, it will be easier for them to follow my methodological approach and to consider it in
re-defining the European continent as a host land for Muslim minorities.
3. Muhajirun in the Contemporary Age and the New Definition of Europe
Since the end of World War II, emigration to Europe from Islamic countries was made possible
in relation to the previous Anglo-French colonial rule, economic and educational reasons, as well as
employment: once, “economic migrants”, in particular in French agriculture, were more necessary
than President Macron would like to admit today. At the same time, in the Arab-Islamic world,
internal migration affected the Gulf in the 1960s and 1970s from poorer Arab states, deteriorating
in the last decades from Muslim countries of South East Asia and from the Indian subcontinent
for the architectural verticalization of these newly established desert towns (Shami 1996, pp. 3–26;
Errichiello 2012, pp. 389–413).
Finally, in the last decades of the 20th century, as well as at the beginning of the new one,
Muslim emigration also began to be directed towards countries that had been countries of emigration
until the 1960s (and still are, in different ways): Italy and Spain, for example, which being the southern
frontier of the European Union (EU) are more geographically accessible and offer job opportunities
that the natives are no longer willing to do.
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Therefore, it is important here to focus the entire discourse on the questions asked at the beginning
of the article considering three distinctive aspects:
1. Can we historically and religiously compare the hijra of early Muhajirin from Mecca, with the
Arab-Muslim emigrants of today? Can we consider the existence of similarities between the early
and the contemporary reasons for emigration?9
2. Has contemporary Islamic thought been able to elaborate a clear understanding and assumption
of responsibility for the political and religious reasons behind these new forms of hijra? Did the
European Union do the same in relation to its foreign policy or worse, its absence in being able to
reply to increasing Islamic migration to the old continent?
3. How are European Islamic intellectuals redefining the European landscape?
1. In this case, the comparative approach needs to be plural and inclusive in considering the real
historical reasons behind Muhammad’s Hijra, then the consequent “Islamic narrative”, which must
absolutely not be denigrated but contemplated as shaping an “Islamic identity”. If the “historical”
version stressed the Prophet’s political evaluation, more than the religious one, in the opportunity
to work out his own “community” of reference as he freely developed the “awha”, God’s inspiration
on him (Q 16, 68; 28, 7); the “Islamic narrative” emphasizes that the new religion was already in
existence from the beginning, from the Prophetic’s phase and the Hijra was his first concrete “public”
policy. Nevertheless, it is historically evident that Muhammad’s return to his hometown, eight years
later, more than a conquest, was a political-religious confirmation of strength, inclusiveness, and
perspicacity. It is evident that today (since post-colonialism), the great majority of the Arab-Islamic
population has lived and it is still living in countries where freedom of speech is not contemplated
and a part of them emigrated to Europe due to them being unable to “speak” or “act” as free men or
women. According to that, it is important to also stress a double assumption: the inability of the huge
majority of the Arab-Islamic states to be democratic after their process of self-determination (1962),
the unwillingness of the “new” democratic world, even though previously colonialist, to support
their attempts at democracy after the process of self-determination, as well as afterwards, during
the recent “Arab Springs”. The last reason is clearly complicated, almost an impossible step due
to the previous European colonialist past, their inclusion in the Cold War, and their attempt to still
control the lost colonial empire (the Anglo-French 1956 war against Egypt clarifies the assumption
just as the Arab perception of the creation of Israel). At the same time, it is also relevant to consider
that a majority of the millions of Arab-Islamic emigrants to Europe decided to leave their countries
of origin for economic reasons and to provide a better future and opportunities to their children.
This generalization today has been adopted to describe them with the denigrative designation of
“economic migrants”. However, it is hard to negate, as, for many centuries, many European citizens
too emigrated in the “New World” for the same political-economic reasons. The Qur’an, like the Sira
an-Nabawiyya (Guillame 1955, pp. 145ff., 212ff.), stressed the need to make the Hijra in relation to clear
political and religious persecution, as well as the impossibility of economically maintaining the family.
Today, in the West Bank, there are entire villages that are only populated for a few months of the year,
because the majority of their inhabitants have decided to emigrate to the West for political-economic
reasons but preserving their rights in coming back to maintain domains and properties against Israeli
settlement policies and legislation. It is historically evident that, even after many centuries, emigration
in Islam has been adopted as a defensive policy, during colonialism (Peters 1979), and more recently to
discharge discrimination or more dangerous actions: it is the case of leading Muslim figures, such as
R. Khomeini and Rashid Ghannouchi, for example, Syrian Sunnite people who escaped from Hafez
al-‘Asad’s regime in the early 1980s and Turks after every military coup since the 1950s, but also Arab
9 The relevance in stressing this comparative approach is related to the still ongoing methodology used by the majority of the
scholars of the ECFR; the possibility of updating led by ijtihad reflects the concretization that the base of the Hijra at the
beginning of the Islamic age is not so dissimilar for the same reasons that are still affecting Muslims citizens today.
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Christian minorities from the entire Middle East (Moussalli 2001, p. 129ff) as well as au rebours, people
who emigrated after Islamic regimes imposed their new rulership in Iran, in Egypt, during the time of
Sadat and Mubarak, like the Egyptian Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and the Iranian Abdolkarim Soroush,
etc. (Miller; Sachedina 2001, p. 102ff.). Even when considering the clear differences between the Hijra
performed by early believers in the 7th century and 20th century Muslim emigration to the West today,
a discrimination policy remained an important reason to act and, as reported by Ibn Ishaq: “[ . . . ]
then God gave the permission to his prophet to undertake the Hijra [ . . . ]”, because “the unbelievers
plotted against you (Muhammad) to confine you or to kill you or to expel you, they plotted and so
God did: He is the best of the schemers” (Q 8: 30).
2. Why, after the deflagration of Syria, those who escaped, tried to reach Europe, and not the
Arab Gulf, is a provocative and very naïve question that is based on an evident assumption: when
the level of war, like fasad and fitna, has reached its apex, hijra is performed towards the territory
that has the best guarantee of a life in peace and justice. However, there is a dual ethical-political
and religious problem in stressing the assumption of responsibility for this contemporary situation.
The level of collusion in the Islamic world, generally speaking, between political power and religious
hierarchies is so eminent that, without considering Salafist-Fundamentalist views Islamic inculturation,
politicization, and secularization (Roy 2008), are losing every kind of moral authority, even only when
talking about the level of corruption of the majority of the Arab-Islamic regimes: the current conflict
between the Egyptian President ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi and al-Azhar university is a Pirandello-like game
of the parties, like the Saudi Arabian Mufti’s defence of Muhammad Bin Salman after the murder of
Kashoggi. In the last CBS 60 minutes interview of the Egyptian president, on 6 January 2019, the huge
number of public lies that were told by the first citizen of the country was so embarrassing that it is hard
to contemplate any kind of inner possible reform starting from civil society or religious institutions.
The higher the level of internal fasad, without considering any clear political-religious persecution,
the more the reasons exist to emigrate for those who can afford it. In considering Ibn Taymiyya’s
Majmu‘Fatawa, but also more recently, Shah ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (d. 1824) fatwa of 1803: “Does Dar al-Islam
become Dar al-Harb or not?” the reply is clear. In al-Durr al-Mukhtar, he states that the Dar al-Islam can
only become Dar al-Harb by three things: “by the enforcement of the rules of the polytheists, by being
contingent to Dar al-Harb and by the fact that no Moslem or Dhimmi remains protected on the strength
of their original amam”.
This opened a huge debate during European colonialism in stressing the possibility of making
the hijra in order to try not living under Western occupation: in India, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya etc.
The debate stressed the production of fatawa which showed a clear inconsistency in proposing war and
nonviolent-resistance and civil disobedience in relation to different approaches. It is therefore evident
that this inability to highlight a common attitude today, as during colonialism, is the plural expression
of a religious hermeneutical interpretation mixed with political, ideological and geographical reasons.
However, in considering on the one hand Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s thought in not performing any kind of
hijra as long as the colonial-occupational power allows you to still accomplish your Islamic daily duties:
the same position assumed by Ibn Taymiyya four centuries earlier (Hunter 1974; Peters 1979); different
efforts were made at developing opposing positions such as that of the Algerian ‘Abd al-Qadir, at the
beginning of the French occupation, who stressed the attempt to obtain juridical responses favourable
to a declaration of Jihad as the impossibility of living under non shari‘atic prescriptions (Shinar 1965).
A conclusive reflection needs now to ponder on whether the incapability in defining, during
Colonialism, all the occupied Islamic lands as Dar al-Sulh or Dar aman was in relation to the rulership
of non-Muslims, because the Qur’anic verses, which proclaim:
“When the angels take the souls of those who have wronged themselves, they ask them,
‘What circumstances were you in?’ They reply, ‘We were oppressed in this land’, (mustad’afin
fi al-ard) and the angels say, ‘But was God’s earth not spacious enough for you to migrate to
some other place?’ These people will have Hell as their refuge, an evil destination, but not so
the truly helpless men, women, and children who have no means in their power nor any way
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to leave–God may well pardon these, for He is most pardoning and most forgiving. Anyone
who migrates for God’s cause will find many a refuge and great plenty in the earth, and if
anyone leaves home as a migrant towards God and His Messenger and is then overtaken by
death, his reward from God is sure. God is most forgiving and most merciful.” (Q 4: 97–100)
are very clear on this, in stressing the fact that you need to be a mustad’af fi al-ard (an oppressed on the
earth) and have the chance to emigrate: two aspects that are closely connected in the Islamic revelation.
3. Finally, when assuming that, in different Arab-Islamic countries, the level of fasad and fitna
is so high as to make them Dar al-Kufr, is it evident that there is the possibility of emigrating to an:
“Ard Allah wasi’ata fatuhajiru fiha? An earth of Allah spacious enough for you to emigrate therein?”,
as it clearly says in the Qur’an. If it is hard to find an Islamic religious authority that is willing to
define Syria, Egypt, or post-Ghedaffi Libya as Dar al-Harb, due to the direct responsibility of some
Arab Islamic but also Western countries; the need to redefine the geography reached by millions
of Muslims is an important assumption in which the political dimension needs to be considered
independent, but also possibly connected with the religious and the economic one. If we do not want
to fragment Muhammad’s concrete political reasons in performing the hijra10 from the more religious
“Islamic narrative” that will emerge in the 9th century only to start considering an “Islamic identity”,
this passage is de facto obligatory in assuming that Europe is a better place to live than the Arab-Islamic
world at the moment.
Tariq Ramadan’s “Space of Testimony” is an interesting idea that is still rooted in al-Ghazali’s 12th
century definition of maslaha (public welfare) in preserving the objective of the Law (Shar’): religion,
life, reason, progeny, and property (Ramadan 2008). However, as argued by A. March, Islamic Law
in a non-Islamic geography is a “vanishing mediator” because it is dissociated from the historical
European juridical tradition based on Common Law or Roman Law, as well as the formal impossibility
of discrimination in relation to religious affiliation, which is also one of the main reasons for migration
from the Arab-Islamic world to Europe in recent decades. Ramadan’s re-updating of al-Ghazali’s
definition of maslaha in contemporary terms argues that freedom to manifest faith and spirituality;
freedom to worship individually and collectively; physical security; freedom to educate others about
Islam; and, freedom to participate in the social, political, and economic life of one’s community
(Ramadan 2004, 2010) are the forerunners in defining Europe differently as a geography where Muslims
and non-Muslims can coexist.
However, this approach that leads Ramadan to define Europe: Dar al-Shahada, the space of
testimony, still needs to be included in considering Ibn Taymiyya’s individual awareness of the complex
plurality of a territory, its complexity in being able to show belief as unbelief, but also in independently
considering the first five points that are reported above.
Can a territory of which unbelief, synonymous with atheism (the creed about the absence of God)
is a part, be antithetical to the freedom manifested in promoting faith and spirituality, individual, and
collective worship; physical security, etc.?
This “space of testimony” should also be able to consider that Muslims’ freedom from government
intrusion on their religious beliefs and practices, like freedom to teach about Islam, act politically, etc.
(Tampio 2011, p. 619), is the outcome of a lengthy historical process in which the option of being or
becoming an atheist, is taken into consideration not as an “un-religious Truth”, but as a human being’s
individual possible choice.
Bassam Tibi’s Islamic humanist approach in relation to “Early Islamic history” reflects on the
assumption that contemporary shari’atization of Islam, certainly a defensive approach by the ‘ulema
10 The political dimension is also historically assumed by the same early Islamic sources as the Sira an-Nabawiyya; contrarily, it
would be impossible to explain the reasons why few members of the early “believers” community in Mecca were allowed to
emigrate to Aksum (614 A.D.), while Muhammad did not emigrate until after the death (619 A.D.) of his guardian uncle,
Abu Talib. (Guillame 1955, p. 191ff.) The political reasons considering this fact emerged as prominent.
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against European colonialism, has created “civilization fault lines on a global scale, while the tradition
of Islamic humanism provides a cross-civilization bridging” (Tibi 2009, 2012).
Tibi’s secularizing approach, which opposed individual rights and pluralism against Islamic
Supramacism or Kalam and Falsafa against Fiqh and Shari’ah, is quite sectarian as a result of the Islamic
Occidentalist view11 (Buruma and Margalit 2004). Just starting from the fact that Islamic Law is a
creation of human beings, so is the plurality of Islamic theology, of Sufism and Falsafa; for this reason,
a society as a territory cannot be juridically defined when supposing the level of faith and unbelief of
its citizens, only God knows, and any human approximation is defective.
If Bassam Tibi’s accusation of T. Ramadan focuses on his proselytizing ethnic ghettoization
and alienation of the European Islamic community from society, the Syrian-German author argues
that multi-culturalism is rooted in cultural-religious relativism (Tibi 2007), which is different from
“cultural pluralism”. In other words, European Muslims cannot consider this continent as Dar al-Islam,
because it will never be a continent populated by an Islamic majority, just as Shari’ah can never be
compared with Common Law; nevertheless, Tibi’s definition of Euro-Islam:
“The major features of Euro-Islam would be laicité, cultural modernity, and an understanding
of tolerance that goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamic believers (People of
the Book, ahl al-kitab). In addition, by acknowledging cultural and religious pluralism,
Euro-Islam would give up the claim of Islamic dominance. Thus defined, Euro-Islam would
be compatible with liberal democracy, individual human rights, and the requirements of a
civil society. It would also contrast sharply with the communitarian politics that result in
ghettoization. To be sure, the politics of Euro-Islam would not allow complete assimilation of
Muslims. Yet it could enable the adoption of forms of civil society leading to an enlightened,
open-minded Islamic identity compatible with European civic culture”
is quite complicated without an integrative process of Euro-Islamic histories and narratives. However,
before reaching this conclusive passage, it is relevant to stress another step that takes inspiration from L.
Babes and T. Oubrou’s debate of Can Islam be French? (Oubrou and Babes 2013): Babes defends the natural
rights of women-men, clings to the universalists’ interpretation of human rights, and seems, as Bowen
remarks too, to be asking Muslim citizens to choose between the two sources of law, Republican and
Scripturalist/Islamic, while Oubrou tries, through his approach, to ask citizens to reconcile them, which
is quite tricky and unable to reach any concrete outcome without a previous step. Can Christianity be
French after the “desolation” allowed by two hundred years of post-Enlightenment-Republican ideology?
If Islam is to be identified with a State, argued Oubrou (2012), at least in Europe, a state-ideology cannot
negate the individual religious affiliation of its citizens, in particular, if this aspect, contrary to: liberté,
égalité, fraternité, is so far away as to be concretely existent in France and in other European countries.
It is difficult to talk about loyal citizenship, women’s equality, and the abolition of polygamy, on which
Oubrou generally agrees, or uniform gender inheritance, when French national assimilationist policy is
unable to consider the personal history of part of its citizens: the important role that they played in
both World Wars, for example, as military forces of liberation in De Gaulle’s army or on the front of La
Somme and Verdun in the previous conflict.
In other words, it is unfair and unequal to continue asking the Muslim minority in Europe to
attend religious celebrations in churches or in a public space every time that a terrorist attack of Islamic
matrix affects the old continent without assuming any responsibility for the devastation that Western
foreign policies have caused and have been causing in the entire Islamic world since 9/11.
11 The adoption of a Western narrative on a non-Western civilization, religion, etc. can assume a form of new-Colonialism.
Fiqh and Kalam are both necessary in contemporary Islam and sometimes Tibi’s approach is not so useful because it is
divisive. Baruma and Margalit stressed, in their pamphlet how Islamic revanchism in the past decades has adopted the same
Western vocabulary and target used during Colonialism. Stressing that Islam needs more philosophy and less jurisprudence
is clear, but not with the same approach as the Orientalist Renan. As this article shows, the attitude still needs to be religious
and historically based.
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4. Conclusions. ECFR and European Continent as Dar al-Hikma
Alexandre Caiero’s article (Caiero 2010): The power of European Fatwas: the minority fiqh project and
the making of an Islamic counterpublic, is important in defining the real target of the ECFR, which was
created in 1997 and based in Dublin, as an institution able to promote an approach of al-indimaj bi-la
dhawaban, “integration without assimilation”. Only partially partaking this assumption, the concrete
risk today is Tibi’s hypothesis of increasing the ghettoization of Muslims minorities in European
geography, which is already hugely scattered by banlieue.
The main problem is not assimilation if there is complete integration, the problem emerges if
the balance between these two aspects is unstable: to consider freedom in relation to a dress code
and afterwards, to promote the abolition of the Hijab (except for security reasons) is symptomatic
of this incoherence. ECFR is an important attempt to institutionalize Islam in Europe; however, the
evident risk in relation to their fatawa (consider the Final Statements12 since 2001–2016, which continue
as though the majority of the Muslim-European population live in an Islamic country and without
considering the previously described positions by Ibn Taymiyya) is not to implement any integration
at all for the conservative and defensive approach that its advisory board is promoting, in trying to
preserve a dualistic geography: that of fatawa proclaimed in a nominal Dar al-Islam with those for the
different territory of a Dar al-Ahd or Dar al-Sulh. In other words, if the majority of the ECFR’s members,
such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi, continue to support the idea that Europe is Dar al-Sulh (Kazemipur 2017,
p. 23), more than integration without assimilation, it proclaiming ongoing segregation with the hope
that in the future, the majority of them, will return to their countries of origin (which is completely
illusory) looks likely. The main problem is still the inability to recognize how “Islamic” the West is,
just as, on the contrary, how non-Islamic Europe is: a problem that emerged on both sides. As argued
by Mohammed Hashas, the ECFR seems “to consider European Muslims as a minority that has to
protect itself from melting in the mainstream society which is generally not religious” (Hashas 2013),
which is humanly comprehensible if the institution itself continues to only consider the Fatawa without
the Research, in stressing its own acronym.
It is time for Europe to become a Dar al-Hikma; a place where research and hermeneutics have been
able to reconsider how important Islamic history has been for the West and how important Western
history has been for the Islamic world. Contrary to Oubrou’s Geo-theological approach (Hashas 2014),
like Aref Nayed’s theology of neighborliness, which are both important ideas, the most significant
step before these is the re-appropriation of a shared Islam-European history and the Old Continent a
laboratory for it.
Bidar (2008, 2012, 2015) in reforming Islam through European modernity and enlightenment
is still too assimilationist from my point of view: the early form of Liberation is not what can be
hermeneutically interpreted from the Qur’an, but what human beings in Islam-Christian history can
exchange with each other. Therefore, it is important that on the one hand, the “critical” discourse
needs to affect Islam and Qur’an from the beginning, from the creation of an “Islamic narrative” in
a huge geography not least Islamic and with a Muslim minority population. On the other hand,
Europe and all the main European countries—France, Spain, Italy, Germany, and England, each in
a different way—need to deconstruct the positivist, post-Enlightenment—Orientalist approach in
integrating the history of the Muslim minority in European history, from al-Andalus and al-Siqilliyya
to the contemporary age. The most significant aspect is to balance integration with assimilation;
this historical methodological approach needs to be included in European textbooks, not only as
a preventive deradicalizing approach, but also as one of real integration. Only afterwards can the
entire European Islamic community properly understand a geo-theological method. The praxis is
not to go through the elimination of significant aspects of European history or its protagonists, but
their comparative integration with the Arab-Muslims actors of their time: Charlemagne and Harun
12 (European Council of Fatwa and Research n.d.).
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al-Rashid, François 1er of France and Suleiman the Magnificent, the historical period of the Crusades
but also the treaty of Jaffa (1228), etc.
The process of integration and assimilation towards a non-Eurocentric critical historical approach
goes through the recognition that both Europeans and Muslims in Europe have something to learn from
each other. In some cases, the process has already started, such as the creation in Germany and in Austria
of Faculties of Islamic Theology, even though, at academic level, as in Spain, courses on Islam in state
schools, are a first step; on the contrary, the creation in France and in the United Kingdom (UK) of Islamic
Schools, even though of a higher level is certainly problematic (Van de Kerchove 2018), because they are
evidently associated with a segregationist policy that a public system cannot intellectually support.
Paraphrasing Bassam Tibi, if the Islamic world has lost its Humanism (Tibi 2012), it is prominent
that the Islamic diaspora in Europe could contribute ad maximum to emphasizing a reversal trend
starting from the integration of their historical background in it. The willingness of people should
naturally meet the willingness of politics, education ministers, teachers, and publishers in a common
project, in which the narrative of the “clash of civilizations”, “war of religions”, and “sectarian
nationalism” can finally be abandoned, after the disasters of the 20th century.
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